







Subjunctive medicine: a manifesto 





Despite the manifest advantages of modern medicine, many aspects of the experience of 
illness and healing are not reducible to bodily dysfunction and its restoration. Clinicians and 
researchers now largely understand that medical practice needs to accommodate a dual 
aspectivity of the physical body and the lived body. This is increasingly operationalised 
through the framework of person-centred care, focussed on initiating, integrating, and 
safeguarding the partnership between the patient-as-person and the clinician-as-person, 
informed by a narrative perspective on selfhood. In this manifesto, we develop the narrative 
focus of person-centred care into an alternative framework for medical practice – subjunctive 
medicine – grounded in ritual efficacy and an explicit appeal to the imagination. We argue 
that the healing effects of a clinical encounter are reliant on the subjunctive co-construction 
of a temporary shared social world for a particular purpose. More explicit awareness of the 
subjunctive nature of the clinical encounter may expand clinicians’ opportunities for healing, 
whilst fostering resilience. We further suggest that, to be fully actualised, subjunctive 
medicine requires a shift towards conscious appreciation of the nature of subjunctivity at the 
social level; a social reawakening to the power of the imagination in modern medicine. 
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The advantages of modern medicine are manifest. Life changing discoveries and 
developments sustain Samuel Johnson’s assessment of the medical profession as the greatest 
benefit to mankind (Porter, 1999). Many medical traditions have proved beneficial, but it is 
legitimate to ascribe much measurable advancement in healing to the modern, biomedical 
conception of illness. We are living longer. We are less afraid of disease. Despite such 
advancement, however, modern medicine has a problem. Many aspects of the experience of 
illness and healing are not reducible to bodily dysfunction and its restoration: medically 
unexplained symptoms abound; chronic comorbidities with social determinants are common; 
recovery can often be achieved without physiological intervention. Overcoming this problem 
requires understanding the complex interaction of myriad clinical and social factors relevant 
to each case; a task for which the single-disease, guidelines-based approach of modern 
medicine is ill-suited (Salisbury, 2012). 
This problem has, of course, long been recognised. There are numerous attempts to 
accommodate what can usefully be described as a dual aspectivity of the physical body and 
the lived body (Fuchs, 2018). Arguably, the dominant approach in modern medicine is 
person-centred care (Ekman et al., 2015; Ekman et al., 2011). In the UK, for example, it is 
now embedded in guidance from both the Royal College of General Practitioners (2018) and 
the Royal College of Physicians (2018). Person-centred care has both a long history and a 
recent resurgence. Grounded in the idea of treating patients as persons, not merely diseases to 
be treated, it can be traced to the earlier framework termed patient-centred care or patient-
centred medicine. However, despite patient- and person-centred care often being conflated, 
there are significant differences. In this article we first chart the development from patient- to 
person-centred care. We then propose that the specific narrative focus of person-centred care 
can be usefully developed into an alternative framework for accommodating the dual 
4 
 
aspectivity of the physical body and the lived body in medicine; a framework grounded in 
ritual efficacy and an explicit appeal to the imagination (Kirmayer, 2006). 
2. From patient- to person-centred care 
Within modern medicine, Edith Balint promoted the dual aspectivity of the physical body 
and the lived body by contrasting illness-oriented medicine focused on localised bodily 
functions, with patient-centred medicine focussed on treating the patient as “a unique human 
being” (Balint, 1969, 269). In exploring the possibilities of such an approach in practice, 
Balint (1969, 276) found that doctors “feel that they are not endangered if they allow their 
patients to tell them what they want in their own time and in their own way”. Following a 
range of proposed definitions over a number of decades, five dimensions of patient-centred 
care were subsequently proposed: a biopsychosocial perspective; the patient-as-person; 
sharing power and responsibility; the therapeutic alliance; and the doctor-as-person (Mead & 
Bower, 2000). Patient-centredness is increasingly influential in both research and clinical 
settings (Scholl et al., 2014) and is linked to high quality patient care (Langberg et al., 2019). 
However, despite attempts to gain consensus, the concept of patient-centredness has been 
criticised for lacking a unified definition (Ishikawa et al., 2013). This is influenced in part by 
the lack of specificity in its underlying biopsychosocial perspective. In critiquing the narrow 
scope of the biomedical model, the biopsychosocial model was presented as a framework in 
which the social, psychological, and behavioural dimensions of illness could be 
accommodated (Engel, 1977). This provided an alternative paradigm for research, teaching, 
and clinical practice. Despite such promise, the model has been criticised for dichotomizing 
bio-psycho-social elements, masking a bio-bio-bio approach, neglecting cultural factors, and 
falling short of explaining linkages and hierarchies within it (Benning, 2015; Ghaemi, 2010; 
Hatala, 2012; McLaren, 1998; Suls & Rothman, 2004). 
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Moreover, although there is much to admire in patient-centred care, in emerging from the 
Western tradition it is inevitably informed by the way in which that tradition has altered our 
conception of the body and what it means to be human. Unlike in other traditions, a Western 
approach to accommodating the lived body is focussed on the self, the individual and related 
identity claims (Porter, 1999). This is predicated upon what Seligman et al. (2008) call a 
‘sincere’ orientation to the world; one that presupposes the existence of an authentic self 
which can be revealed. Accordingly, sincerity (conceived in these terms) has informed a 
dominant discourse of self-fulfilment that has become progressively detached from 
interpersonal moral demands and unconditional relationships (Taylor, 1991). In this regard 
patient-centred care is, anthropologically speaking, unique. The ethnographic record reveals 
great cross-cultural diversity, but one searches vainly for a medical tradition in which 
interpersonal engagement between healer and sick person resembles that of patient-centred 
care. 
Although many healing traditions address the patient-as-person, this does not correspond 
to an individual, ‘buffered’ conception of it (Taylor, 1989). The patient-as-person in many 
such societies is often a composite of different elements, which are in unstable relationship 
with elements that populate the environment. In animistic societies, for instance, one often 
speaks of the person as the union between ‘body’ and ‘soul’ (or ‘souls’). Illness is thought to 
arise when the soul outsteps its bodily boundaries and wanders; or when, by wandering, is 
snatched by spiritual beings. Medical efforts in such instances are directed at discovering 
which particular agent has stolen the soul – divination far outweighs treatment in importance 
– before the shamanic treatment addresses the agent in an attempt to call the soul back 
(Nathan & Stengers, 2018). By focusing on external entities, healing rituals need not be 
directed at the sick individual. Even when the treatment does engage the sick individual – 
usually through dramatic and emotionally moving performance – this engagement is not 
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aimed at sincerely knowing the person behind the disease. The ritual instead employs a set of 
culturally accepted constructs (soul, spirits, etc.) and reworks them, enacting a metaphorical 
transformation that exerts an effect on the sick person’s consciousness (Kirmayer, 1993). 
Although cross-cultural uniqueness does not, in and of itself, constitute a direct 
challenge to patient-centred care, it at least questions its wisdom. A more direct challenge can 
be found in ethnographic research showing that, even in modern medicine, sincere 
engagement with the patient as “a unique human being” (Balint, 1969, 269) – a discrete self –  
is often not the way consultations are conducted. Working among occupational therapists in a 
North American hospital, Cheryl Mattingly (1998) showed how patients and clinicians co-
create narrative worlds that are not merely mimetic, but active processes of sense making: 
patients and clinicians emplot particular actions to develop usefully towards recovery. In 
exploring the diagnosis and treatment of atherosclerosis in a Dutch university hospital, 
Annemarie Mol (2002) showed how medicine enacts its objects of concern and treatment. If 
we accept this premise, rather than understanding the unique person behind the disease, as 
patient-centred care would prescribe, we must instead understand how each enactment of 
treatment is appropriate to the situation in hand. 
Informed by the narrative account foregrounded by Mattingly and others, a recent 
approach has seen a move from patient- to person-centred care. This move – promoted by the 
University of Gothenburg Centre for Person-Centred Care (GPCC) – is founded on the 
premise that a focus on the ‘patient’ objectifies and reduces that person to a mere recipient of 
medical services (Ekman et al., 2011). Person-centred care is focussed on initiating, 
integrating, and safeguarding the partnership between the patient-as-person and the clinician-
as-person through three clinical tasks or routines (Britten et al., 2017; Ekman et al., 2015; 
Ekman et al., 2011): elicit the patient’s narrative; share information, deliberation and decision 
making; and record the patient’s narrative and shared goals. 
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Proponents of person-centred care are keen to distance the framework from patient-
centred care. However, in isolation, the three underlying routines can be interpreted as 
analogous with routines derived from its ancestor. Eliciting the patient’s narrative seems 
close to Balint’s (1969, 276) call for doctors to “allow their patients to tell them what they 
want in their own time and in their own way”; as others have noted, “the theme of sharing 
medical power and involving patients is an almost universal element of published 
descriptions [of patient-centred care]” (Mead & Bower, 2000, 1090); and a more recent focus 
on the co-ordination of care (Langberg et al., 2019) reflects the focus in person-centred care 
on safeguarding the clinician-patient partnership through documentation. The most 
significant difference between patient- and person-centred care derives from the latter’s 
underlying philosophy of personalism (Britten et al., 2017; Ekman et al., 2015). 
Personalism is a wide-ranging philosophical term with many attributions. The 
Gothenburg model of person-centred care’s version is grounded in Paul Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of selfhood, as presented in his 1986 Gifford Lectures (Ricoeur, 1992). Person-
centred care derives its narrative focus from this account. For Ricoeur, narrative plays a 
central role in both the creation and maintenance of identity in a framework whereby one’s 
self is conceived in terms of action and potentiality, through attestation by oneself and others. 
It does so by mediating between two aspects of identity. On the one hand, idem or sameness; 
a person as a substance in time and space. On the other, ipse or the being of self; a person as a 
changing reflexive being with history. Narratives are thus indispensable for person-centred 
care as they synthesise idem and ipse into what Ricoeur – taking from Hannah Arendt – calls 
a narrative identity. The ‘person’ in person-centred care, therefore, must be interpreted within 
an emerging web of relations rather than the ‘buffered’ individual of patient-centred care. 
This allows person-centred care to be more usefully integrated with alternative frameworks 
such as, for example, family-centred or relationship-centred care. 
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However, despite the dispersed narrative notion of the Ricoeurian self that underpins 
the Gothenburg model of person-centred care, as others have noted it is difficult to castoff 
“the assumption that the patient narrative corresponds to the authentic and individual 
testimony of a unique… person” (Naldemirci et al., 2018, 61). This is exacerbated by 
statements in key person-centred care papers that suggest a more individualised, unique self, 
insofar as person-centred care is focussed on “the importance of knowing the person behind 
the patient” (Ekman et al., 2011, 249). In such terms, the ‘sincere’ orientation appears 
retained. Moreover, although we agree with recent critical developments in person-centred 
care that focus “on the interaction – that which connects different actors – rather than on the 
individual person” (Naldemirci et al., 2018, 67), we suggest that such a positioning may be 
difficult to achieve. By the time one has stretched the grammar of the term ‘person-centred’ 
past a focus on the individual to interactions in a web of contextual relations, it is 
unsurprising that confusion exists. To avoid such confusion, some researchers suggest 
“incorporating… the key features of person-centredness – but at the same time refraining 
from using the term” (Leplege et al., 2007, 1565). 
The practical validity of stretching the grammar of the term ‘person-centred’ 
notwithstanding, the narrative focus of the Gothenburg model of person-centred care informs 
our proposed framework to accommodate the dual aspectivity of the lived body and the 
physical body in modern medicine. In an ethnography of a general practice surgery in 
England, researchers led by one of us developed Mol’s proposal that medicine enacts the 
objects of its concern and treatment (Hardman et al., 2020). Developing a dispositional 
account of general medical practice, Hardman et al. proposed that clinicians develop and 
adapt the good habits necessary for general practice by adopting a second-order, meta-habit 
of enaction, insofar as they conceive of each consultation as collaboratively enacted. 
Hardman et al. tentatively suggested that such an explicitly imaginative and participatory 
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account reveals an important feature of the general practice consultation: it is conducted as 
much in the subjunctive as the indicative mood. From this proposition, they proposed a 
framework for medical practice termed subjunctive medicine. Given that Rita Charon alluded 
to the importance of subjunctivity when acting with narrative knowledge in healthcare – 
“with such knowledge, we enter others’ narrative worlds and accept them – at least 
provisionally – as true” (Charon, 2006, 10) – we suggest that this tentatively proposed 
framework for medical practice offers a useful revision of the dominant approach of person-
centred care. Drawing on philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, and cognitive science, here 
we explicate subjunctivity and its consequences for medicine in more detail. 
3. Subjunctivity 
The concept of subjunctivity is grounded in linguistics. Although our interpretation is 
broadly socio-cultural, the two dimensions are related. As such, we first explore a linguistic 
interpretation of subjunctivity – with respect to conditional sentences – from which we 
develop our more socio-culturally influenced account, grounded in ritual efficacy and the 
importance of the imagination. 
3.1. The linguistic dimension of subjunctivity 
Linguistically, the subjunctive is a grammatical mood used to express possibilities or 
hypotheticals (an irrealis mood), which can be compared with the indicative used to express 
statements of fact (a realis mood). A conditional sentence provides a scenario described by 
an antecedent and then makes a claim about it in its consequent. The grammatical division 
between the subjunctive and indicative is reflected in the two broadly available kinds of 
conditional sentences (Iatridou, 2000; Lewis, 1973; von Fintel, 2012). In the indicative mood, 
the consequent of a conditional (e.g. good interpersonal understanding between patient and 
clinician) can only seriously be considered if the antecedent (a genuinely engaged clinician) 
holds outside the particular situation (the consultation). In other words, in the indicative 
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mood we take the antecedent to hold across all possible social worlds. However, in the 
subjunctive mood the consequent of a conditional can be seriously considered even if the 
antecedent does not hold so completely (if he had done X, Y would have happened). This can 
be understood linguistically as when a layer of past tense morphology is used modally rather 
than temporally as an exclusion feature, which distinguishes the discussed social worlds from 
the speaker’s actual one (Iatridou, 2000; von Fintel, 2012). 
The debates on counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals in linguistics and 
philosophy are manifest and well beyond the scope of this article. For our purposes, it is 
enough to say, first, that a conditional – whether indicative or subjunctive – provides a 
scenario in which the antecedent holds. And second, that in a subjunctive conditional the 
scope of such holding is particular. This notion of subjunctive conditionality highlights that, 
through our use of language, we can usefully create temporary shared social worlds for a 
particular purpose. The psychologist Paul Harris (2000) argued that such capacity to imagine 
alternative worlds and their implications is vital to child development. The biological 
anthropologist Terrence Deacon (1997, 22) went so far as suggesting that such a “shared 
virtual world” marks humans out as a symbolic species. Jerome Bruner – so integral in 
connecting the disciplines of psychology and anthropology – was even more explicit. In 
proposing two complementary yet irreducible modes of cognitive functioning, logico-
scientific and narrative, Bruner (1986, 26) argued that the latter relies on the ability to express 
human possibility and contingency through “subjunctivising reality”. The importance of 
contingency, possibility, and the creation of shared social worlds leads to our socio-cultural 
interpretation of subjunctivity that more directly supports our thesis. 
3.2. The socio-cultural dimension of subjunctivity 
In socio-cultural terms, the subjunctive mode of experience finds its maximal 
expression in ritual (Seligman et al., 2008). Rituals enact an imaginary ‘as if’ social world 
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delimited in time and space. They do not comprise behaviours that express propositional 
views about the nature of the world which participants ordinarily hold. They comprise actions 
that, instead, mark a decoupling, in both act and intention, from the indicative mode of 
everyday engagement. During ritual processes, common ontological and epistemological 
debates can be deflated. Confucius expressed this well: famously uninterested in whether 
spirits exist or not, he nevertheless insisted that when “he offered sacrifice to his ancestors he 
felt as if his ancestral spirits were actually present” (Chan, 1963, 25). As in a game, where 
rules depart from those of ordinary life, participants consciously engage in a distinct domain 
of action, and yet find no fundamental contradiction in doing so. One of the main differences 
between the two is that rituals, unlike most games, can have deep transformative power. 
To people who live in contexts where so-called ‘world-religions’ are dominant, rituals 
often appear as formalised rule following. Although this characterisation is ascribable to 
some ceremonies of the doctrinal, liturgy-based ‘world-religions’, it does not apply to many 
observed ritual performances, especially healing performances (Csordas, 1987). The 
anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep (1908/1960, 13) theorized the transformative effects of 
such acts, proposing that rituals almost invariably “accompany transitions from one situation 
to another and from one… social world to another”. Focusing mostly on rites of passage such 
as initiations, marriages or funerals, he noted that the central part of ritual – its liminal phase 
– has very few attributes of the previous and subsequent phases. In the liminal phase, after 
severing ties with their previous situation, the participant goes through a state of ambiguity 
involving complex and unconventional symbolism, emerging as a new person in some 
important respects. As Victor Turner (1980) later added, this phase takes place in a 
subjunctive mood. In classic rites of passage, this transforms social identity. In healing 
rituals, it potentially transforms health. This contrasts with the claim in person centred care 
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that “ritualistic… care processes… afford few opportunities for the formation of meaningful 
patient–provider relationships” (Ekman et al., 2011, 249). 
As we infer from linguistics, the subjunctive is primarily a realm of possibility (perhaps 
more accurately, virtuality (Deleuze, 1968/2014)): a realm in which novel configurations of 
ideas and relations, unentertained in ordinary indicative life, are explored and enacted. As 
Turner (1980, 164) put it, in ritual “actuality takes the sacrificial plunge into possibility and 
emerges as a different kind of actuality”. The liminal domain of ritual is one that nurtures 
emotional states such as desire, wish, hypothesis, uncertainty, and play. Healing rituals, in 
particular, foster a mood of hope (Kube et al., 2019). Many medical traditions enhance this 
mood through symbolism that presupposes, in its very framing, the possibility of 
transformation. For example, casting illness in terms of recoverable soul-loss already implies 
the possibility of healing. What the ritual later enacts is a search for the afflicting agent and 
the retrieval of the soul. The ritualised setting and processes enable the patient to attach their 
emotions to particular symbols, which the healer gradually manipulates, resulting in 
emotional transformation (Dow, 1986; Kirmayer, 1993). 
The particular aesthetics of ritual performance are fundamental to the transformative 
goal of healing rituals. Music, touch, drama, and visual symbols act as cognitive and 
emotional shifters (Hinton & Kirmayer, 2016) that help the sick person disengage from rigid 
mind-frames and slide into a subjunctive mood. We suggest that the same process, though 
under-acknowledged, happens in secular, biomedical settings. The operating room, for 
instance, is a setting discontinuous with everyday life, typified by high-tech paraphernalia 
and arbitrary forms of behaviour, and most importantly by an obsession with maintaining 
boundaries (motivated partly by a real concern over infection) (Katz, 1981). The primary care 
clinic, as a circumscribed domain in which particular symbols and stylised behaviour appear 
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to the patient, has many of the same attributes (Berger & Mohr, 2016). These contexts show 
structural similarities with healing rituals witnessed by anthropologists around the world. 
The potential productive capacity of liminality and subjunctivity has been explored 
more minimally in modern medical contexts, with respect to uncertainty in illness experience 
(Dauphin et al., 2019; Frumer, 2017; Good & Del Vecchio Good, 1994; Whyte, 2005). In 
rejecting traditional accounts of uncertainty in medicine – wherein uncertainty arises when 
patients are unable to make sense of their experience (Mishel, 1981, 1988) – a subjunctive 
interpretation suggests uncertainty can instead stimulate meaning making and coping 
processes (Dauphin et al., 2019). Further implicit manifestations of subjunctivity in modern 
medicine can be seen in its attempts to treat mental ill health. In taking a narrative perspective 
on therapy, White and Epston (1990) proposed that therapists seek to establish counterplots to 
their clients’ entrenched problems, and that this process occurs more in the subjunctive than 
the indicative mood. This use of the subjunctive is arguably not constrained to narrative 
therapy (Hedtke & Winslade, 2005). As the psychiatric profession has realised, the categories 
used to diagnose mental illness – institutionalised in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders – are, in themselves, interpretations. Yet despite the fictive nature of 
diagnostic categories, the process of labelling can help to acknowledge a patient’s suffering 
and offer a coherent explanation of their symptoms – not unlike the shaman who explains a 
person’s illness through the idiom of soul-loss. The potential therapeutic value of fiction, 
created between clinician and patient, is also important in psychoanalysis through the 
concepts of ‘transference’ or the ‘transitional object’ (Winnicott, 2005). 
Many anthropological accounts suggest that healing rituals, whether conducted in the 
modern clinic or the shaman’s hut, are subjunctive in character. Beyond such accounts, we 
further propose that what in modern medicine is misleadingly called the ‘placebo effect’ is in 
fact the effect of ritualization in a subjunctive mode. In a pioneering study, Stewart Wolf 
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(1950) demonstrated that the nausea-inducing action of ipecac depended on verbal suggestion 
and that the effect may be more potent than the characteristic pharmacologic action. Other 
studies reinforce the idea that beliefs, in some form, might influence patients’ response to 
treatment (Colloca & Miller, 2011; Kirsch, 1985; Lasagna et al., 1954; Levine et al., 1978). 
Further studies have identified potential neurobiological mechanisms underpinning these 
findings (Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999; Eippert et al., 2009). 
More directly related to ritual and subjunctivity, the placebo effect varies depending on 
the type and character of treatment. This is plausibly explained by the different aesthetic 
quality of such treatments. For example, sham surgeries are often more effective than 
‘placebo pills’ for the same condition because of the high-tech paraphernalia and the 
powerful aesthetic hold they have on the patient (Goetz et al., 2008; Moerman, 2002). The 
same considerations apply to a healer’s persona. The powerful effect that a doctor or healer 
can have on a patient is partially attributable to their ability – often expressed in non-verbal 
demeanour (e.g. Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2011; Tschacher et al., 2014) – to help the patient 
shift into a subjunctive engagement with the healing encounter. Such an interpretation of the 
placebo effect suggests it represents not the power of a pill but the power of ritual, insofar as 
“‘placebo’ names a social situation not a substance” (Kirmayer, 2011, 121).The pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey (1938/1998, 384) defined such a social situation as an “environing 
experienced world”, in which organisms and the environment are coupled in dynamical 
relations (Gallagher, 2017). In such terms, the ‘placebo effect’ (and thus the effect of 
subjunctive medicine) is the effect of a social world subjunctively co-constructed (enacted) 
by clinician and patient. Such a pragmatist interpretation develops the deflationary 
epistemological orientation of subjunctive ritual processes. Dichotomies such as knowing and 
believing, truth and falsehood, are replaced with a notion of making indeterminate situations 
determinant through a focus on conceived practical effects (Peirce, 1878/1982). And as 
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Charles Sanders Peirce would propose in his later formulation of the ‘pragmatic maxim’, 
such focus on conceived practical effects requires a subjunctive formulation (Misak, 2004, 
2013). 
Recent findings have further shown that the placebo effect can occur even if the patient 
knows that the treatment is a placebo, through what is termed ‘open-label’ placebo treatment 
(Carvalho et al., 2016; Kaptchuk et al., 2010; Sandler et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2019). This 
result has been widely perceived as counterintuitive, but if we understand treatment as taking 
place in a subjunctive mode, the problem dissipates. It is precisely because ritual entails a 
decoupling from everyday life that the indicative knowledge about the ‘placebo’ as an inert 
substance is, to a degree, inconsequential. During the process of ritualization, the patient is 
induced to act ‘as if’ the ‘placebo’ had the potential to be an effective medicine. There are 
valid critiques of open-label placebo treatment, most notably its potential practical validity 
(Ainsworth et al., 2019; Miller, 2018). Nevertheless, in line with our broader assessment of 
the placebo concept, even if direct open-label placebo treatment does not prove useful, open-
label placebo experiments still provide proof of concept for the subjunctive character of 
healing rituals in modern healthcare environments (Kaptchuk, 2002, 2011; Kaptchuk et al., 
2009; Myers, 2010); as one of us has previously suggested, the effects of open-label placebo 
treatment are not caused by the ‘inert’ pill itself, but by the construction and exploitation of a 
whole treatment situation (Ainsworth et al., 2019). 
4. Subjunctive medicine 
Findings from linguistics, anthropological interpretations of ritual, and placebo studies 
research support the proposition that effective healing encounters are subjunctive in 
character. Existing research on subjunctivity in modern medicine has focussed minimally on 
the implications of uncertainty in illness experience, inasmuch as such uncertainty can, in a 
subjunctive mode, be productive. In a recent ethnography, one of us argued that the 
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subjunctive character of medical practice is more extensive, proposing three principal actions 
that comprise such a form of medical practice (Hardman et al., 2020, 7): “conceive of each 
consultation as collaboratively enacted anew; exploit the importance of the imagination in 
developing interpersonal relationships; explicitly adopt a clinical role to improve resilience”. 
To conclude our account, we expand these actions into a more complete manifesto for 
subjunctive medicine, which reflects both the interpersonal and social consequences of 
practising subjunctive medicine. 
In interpersonal terms, subjunctive medicine is not just a case of clinicians applying the 
principles of good evidence-based clinical practice to their presenting patient. It is instead an 
action-oriented, generative process of co-construction particular to each encounter. Through 
such co-construction, the consultation carries its own mode of directed intentionality that 
minimises the internal states of the clinician and patient. This, in part, accords with recent 
critical interpretations of person-centred care which focus “on the interaction… that… 
connects different actors” (Naldemirci et al., 2018, 67). Despite such focus, however, we do 
not advocate a thin behaviourist notion of action set against ‘sincere’ intent. As others have 
noted more generally, such an approach is as misguided as a modern emphasis on sincerity 
through which ‘authentic’ inner motives are privileged over action (Seligman et al., 2008). In 
explicating subjunctive medicine, we instead promote a re-balancing of the subjunctive and 
indicative in medicine, acknowledging the uniqueness of each enacted and embodied 
consultation, and the tension between its connection with and separation from everyday life. 
We propose that clinicians should exploit the ritual-like structure of the consultation 
and the opportunities for resilient interpersonal connection the subjunctive mode affords. This 
may include acting in different ways, for different patients, with different conditions, at 
different times. This may include clinicians presenting a persona related to but removed from 
the way in which they act in everyday life. As other researchers have alluded to, one way to 
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improve clinicians’ capacity to practise subjunctively may be to incorporate contemporary 
performance practices into modern medical education, including: opportunities for active 
rehearsal in simulation settings rather than through scripted role-play; increased emphasis on 
improvisation in training; and increased exposure to medically oriented literature and theatre 
(Hooker & Dalton, 2020). 
As one of us noted in the ethnography in which the framework was created, subjunctive 
medicine does not provide a distinct set of routines or tasks for clinicians to accomplish 
(Hardman et al., 2020); given the existing complexity of modern medical practice, one could 
argue clinicians need fewer routines, not more. Instead, it promotes a change in mindset, 
whereby clinicians, in the words of a GP in the initial ethnography, can become more 
“imaginative with how… [they] approach people” (Hardman et al., 2020, 7). Thus, by 
promoting the importance of the imagination in modern medicine, we do not suggest 
clinicians refrain from directly questioning patients; this, of course, is vital. Rather, we 
propose that the ways in which they enact interpersonal relationships in the clinic should be 
guided by a Deweyan focus on making the local indeterminate situation determinate. This 
highlights one useful corollary of subjunctive medicine: it answers the problem of deciding 
what is relevant to the particular consultation. Because a situation “is dominated and 
characterized throughout by a… pervasive and internally integrating quality” (Dewey, 1931, 
97), subjunctive medicine emphasises that what is relevant to a clinician is not just evidence-
based medical guidelines (and the tools and practices by which to implement them) or a 
priori ethical principles or values, but also the person in front of them, their (potentially 
shared) history, and myriad other factors. What subjunctive medicine also emphasises is that 
from these myriad factors, what is relevant can only be grasped intuitively in terms of the 
environing experienced world of which the clinician is an integral part. 
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This account of subjunctive medicine has largely focussed on the clinician. However, in 
the co-construction of the clinical encounter within a subjunctive mode, the patient 
necessarily plays their part too. But as with the dominant framework of person-centred care, 
this part is largely played without explicit reference to any framework of medical practice. 
Person-centred care outlines routines to be conducted by the clinician in order to facilitate 
what many patients already want and attempt to do: i.e. be explicitly involved and 
foregrounded in decisions on their care, through the development of a partnership with their 
clinician. Analogous to such an approach, through subjunctive medicine we attempt to enable 
clinicians to facilitate what many patients already want and attempt to do. As evidenced in 
the initial ethnography (Hardman et al., 2020), patients – as well as clinicians – present a 
persona in the clinic related to but removed from the way in which they act in everyday life. 
By practising subjunctively, insofar as they focus on the co-construction of a temporary 
social world for a particular purpose, clinicians create the conditions for patients to ‘enact 
with’ rather than be ‘acted on’. Such a temporary world is one “where differences can be 
accommodated, tolerance enacted (if not fully understood) and openness to others 
maintained.” (Seligman, 2010, 15). The outcome of subjunctive medicine for patients, 
therefore, is the creation of the conditions most conducive to developing interpersonal 
understanding and connection with their clinician. Moreover, due to a focus on the 
temporariness of the co-constructed social situation, such connection is not purely reliant on 
a shared history. This may be increasingly useful as modern medicine, particularly primary 
care, moves to a more multidisciplinary future in which different aspects of treatment are 
distributed amongst various healthcare professionals (Royal College of General Practitioners, 
2019). 
Subjunctive medicine is, in scope, a general framework for accommodating the lived as 
well as the physical body in modern medicine. As such, it is not a priori restricted to 
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particular conditions or particular specialties. Subjunctive medicine could be practised by all 
clinicians in all situations. Nevertheless, in focussing on accommodating the lived body, the 
advantages of subjunctive medicine are likely to be greatest where such accommodation is 
most useful. With respect to particular medical issues this will likely include chronic illness 
management, multimorbidity, polypharmacy, medically unexplained symptoms, mental 
health, and conditions whereby social and cultural determinants play a substantial role. With 
respect to particular medical specialties, subjunctive medicine is likely to be most useful in, 
for example, primary care, geriatrics, psychiatry, and clinical psychology; and less useful in, 
for example, emergency medicine and surgery. 
As outlined above, our proposition that clinicians and patients should more explicitly 
exploit the ritual-like temporary co-construction of the medical consultation has potential 
positive consequences in itself. Nevertheless, we further propose that to be fully actualised 
subjunctive medicine requires a wider restructuring of the social imagination: a shift towards 
conscious appreciation of the nature of subjunctivity at the social level. The subjunctive mode 
has been suppressed by a cultural and institutional emphasis on a ‘sincere’ orientation 
towards the world, which only admits the indicative ‘as is’ vision of reality (Seligman, 2010; 
Seligman et al., 2008). This has led to the perception that ‘as if’ and ‘as is’ visions – 
complementary in most human societies – are fundamentally incompatible. A societal 
recognition of subjunctivity would help dispel the concern in modern medicine that treating 
both the lived body and the physical body is unachievable. The appreciation that medical 
consultations take place in a circumscribed domain of action – involving concepts and 
imagined entities unentertained in the indicative mode of ordinary life – would allow 




It is hard to envisage specifically what a societal recognition of subjunctivity would 
mean for medical practice. Plausibly, it would include the incorporation of stories, metaphors, 
narratives and myths into medical consultations, as occurs in some societies whereby “the 
elementary aspects of… social life are the essential background to… medicine” (Glick, 1967, 
39). As such, we envisage subjunctive medicine as compatible, but developing, narrative 
approaches to medicine (Charon, 2001, 2006; Charon et al., 2017; Mattingly, 1998): 
compatible, insofar as we acknowledge the importance of ‘narrative competence’ for medical 
practice; developing, insofar as we reject the precept in narrative medicine that 
“practitioners… must be prepared to offer the self as a therapeutic instrument… willing to 
suffer in the process” (Charon, 2006, 215), instead foregrounding the generative and resilient 
capacity of the subjunctive mode. In these terms, subjunctive medicine is partly a process of 
un-concealing existing, local cultural ideas and practices currently underused in modern 
medicine – through what Charles Taylor (1991) calls a work of retrieval. 
Beyond such a work of retrieval, subjunctive medicine might also involve the 
introduction of new metaphors with similar explanatory roles to the concepts of ‘soul’ or 
‘spirits’ in certain societies and healing traditions. Whatever form such new ideas take, they 
must not be perceived as incompatible with biomedicine and its exclusive focus on the 
physical body. By emerging only within the demarcated context of the healing ritual, these 
would not undermine biomedical naturalism. Instead, they would enhance it. The result 
would be a broader medical pluralism, without the drawbacks associated with exclusive 
ideological allegiances to particular therapeutic practices. As anthropologists have shown, in 
societies not typified by the cultural and institutional dominance of ‘sincerity’, medical 
pluralism is the norm. In the ethnographic record it is hard to find widespread ideological 
commitment to specific healing systems; or, for that matter, ideological tension between 
modern and traditional medical systems. When in need, people adopt a pragmatic stance – 
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often shuffling across disparate healing systems – seeking treatments based on available 
knowledge and resources. What underpins and enables such medical pluralism, we maintain, 
is the social appreciation of subjunctivity. 
5. Conclusion 
As we outlined in our introduction, the advances of modern medicine are manifest. To 
deny that is to deny experience. But as we also outlined, modern medicine struggles to 
accommodate treatment of the lived body and the physical body. This has caused unnecessary 
suffering. Developing the narrative focus of the dominant way in which this problem has 
been addressed – person-centred care – we propose the alternative framework of subjunctive 
medicine, whereby clinician and patient co-construct a temporary shared social world for a 
particular purpose. In so doing, we reach past modernity’s exaltation of the indicative to a 
rich cultural history in which subjunctivity and possible worlds have currency (Turner, 1982). 
We argue that modern medicine should embrace the subjunctive character of the clinical 
encounter and thus expand opportunities for healing. To fully facilitate this, what is 
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